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EQUITABLE REMEDIES IN
SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Power to Fashion Equitable Remedies
Section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 au-
thorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to bring
an action to enjoin any person who "is engaged or about to
engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute
a violation of [these] provisions . . . ."I Section 27 of this Act
confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear "all
suits in equity.., brought to enforce any liability or duty created
by [the Act.]"'2 Pursuant to the equitable power conferred by
these sections and analogous provisions of the Securities Act of
1933, 3 the courts, at the behest of the SEC, have fashioned a
broad range of remedies, often ancillary to the issuance of an
injunction, to aid in rectifying fraud and to protect against fu-
ture violations. Remedies imposed in enforcement actions have
become increasingly varied, 4 falling basically into three cate-
gories: (a) the remedying of past abuses through the grant of
monetary relief;5 (b) the prevention of future fraud by requiring
the adoption of special corporate procedures; 6 and (c) the tem-
porary appointment of special agents in cases of gross misman-
agement requiring unusual control or wholesale replacement of
existing management.
7
The power of the courts to grant SEC requests for relief
beyond a simple injunction against further wrongdoing appears
1 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
3 15 U.S.C. § 77(t), (v) (1970).
For an extensive review of various types of ancillary relief, see Mathews, SEC Civil
Injunctive Actions-II, 5 REv. SEc. REG. 949 (1972).
5 Text accompanying notes 40-50 infra. The Commission is not empowered to seek
relief on behalf of private parties. In the context of this Comment, monetary relief refers
to remedies which require defendants to give up money which they have obtained unlaw-
fully; compensation to individual private parties is incidental to the thrust of the en-
forcement action.
6 Text accompanying notes 51-65 inf'a.
7 Text accompanying notes 66-146 inyra.
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well-established. The statutory grant of equitable power to the
courts includes all power necessary to make effective the decree
rendered by the court.
The SEC has no express statutory authority to seek re-
scission, restitution, or other forms of equitable monet-
ary relief. The Commission, however, may institute an
action for injunctive relief and, once the equity jurisdic-
tion of the district court has been properly invoked, the
court has power to grant all equitable relief necessary
under the circumstances.... Ancillary relief contributes
to effective enforcement of the securities laws by depriv-
ing defendants of gains made through violations, by
deterring future violations, and by increasing the over-
all efficiency of Rule 1Ob-5 and similar actions.
8
The power to effectuate the equitable decree is part of the
court's ancillary jurisdiction9 and exists in all cases absent a
specific statutory denial. 10 It is the necessary means to protect
the authority of the court by assuring that its decrees are
meaningful." To the extent that the remedies requested by the
SEC serve specifically to effectuate the terms of the injunction,
that is, to prevent future wrongdoing, they are surely well within
the ancillary power of the court.
A somewhat broader basis for the exercise of judicial power
has emerged in the wake of the successful imposition of the
disgorgement-of-profits remedy in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.'2 Initially there was some doubt whether a remedy which was
not truly ancillary to the injunction could be imposed in an en-
forcement action.' 3 Thus, in Texas Gulf Sulphur the relief re-
quested was purely compensatory and remedial and could not,
in a formal sense, be considered necessary to effectuate the pro-
visions of the injunction, which was directed at the abatement of
future wrongdoing. The court there nonetheless refused to read
8 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390-91 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
' See I J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 171(1) (5th ed. 1941).
10 See Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 737-38 (D.C. Cir.1969).
11 Id. (power to order expungement of an arrest record properly ancillary to the
court's power to declare the innocence of a defendant in a criminal case).
12 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
" See, e.g., Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits fordViolation of Rule lOb-5, 79
HARv. L. REv. 656 (1966); Comment, SEC Enforcement of the Rule lOb-5 Duty to Disclose
Material Information-Remedies and the Texas Gulf Sulphur Case, 65 MICH. L. Rev. 944
(1967); cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971).
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the Act to exclude this remedy.' 4 Relying on Supreme Court
cases dealing with governmental enforcement in other regula-
tory areas' 5 and the recent decisions under the securities acts
clarifying the scope of remedies in favor of private litigants,' 6
the court held "that the SEC may seek other than injunctive
relief in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, so long as such
relief is remedial relief .... ,,a7
Power to impose the disgorgement-of-profits remedy, which
is not strictly ancillary to the issuance of an injunction, derives
from the general power of the federal courts to fashion federal
common law in order to effectuate legislative programs.' 8 Con-
gress necessarily legislates for the broad range of cases, leaving
the effective implementation of its scheme to the courts and
regulatory agencies. Enforcement of a legislative scheme may
simply involve statutory construction, but it often includes the
creation and implication of remedies going beyond the specific
mandates of an act and involving, essentially, judicial law-
making.' 9 Congress has enacted a comprehensive regulatory
scheme in the securities field to "insure the maintenance of fair
11 446 F.2d at 1307-08.
'5 Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (allowing restitution
tinder the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1970)); United States
v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616 (1951) (defendant required to make restitution of overceiling
rentals in violation of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, ch. 163, 61 Stat. 193); Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946) (landlord could be ordered to make restitution
of excess rents charged in violation of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26,
56 Stat. 23).
6 Mills v. Electric Atito-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), (private litigant need show
only a material misstatement in a proxy statement to establish causation element in an
action tinder § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)).
17 446 F.2d at 1308 (emphasis added).
18 See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and
Discietion in the Choice oJ National and State Rules Jor Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797
(1957).
" See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 402-03 n.4 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring):
The Boiak case is an especially clear example of the exercise of federal jtdicial
power to accord damages as an appropriate remedy in the absence of any
express statutory atthorization of a federal cause of action. There we
"implied"-from what can only be characterized as an "exclusively procedural
provision" affording access to a federal fortim ...- a private cause of action for
damages for violation of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .... We
did so in an area where federal regulation has been singularly comprehensive
and elaborate administrative enforcement machinery had been provided. The
exercise of judicial power involved in Borak simply cannot be justified in terms
of statutory construction .... The notion of "implying" a remedy, therefore, as
applied to cases like Borak, can only refer to a process whereby the federal
judiciary exercises a choice among traditionally available judicial remedies accord-
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and honest markets"' 20 and to provide "full and fair disclosure of
the character of securities sold . . . and to prevent frauds in the
sale thereof .... ,,2' The power to implement these policies has
been given to the SEC and to the courts and it is necessary that
these institutions have the flexibility to enforce the securities acts
in ways that are particularly suited to the case at hand.
Competence [in the judiciary to make law] is essential to
the effective implementation of the legislative powers
committed to the national government by the Constitu-
tion. . . . At the very least, effective Constitutionalism
requires recognition of power in the federal courts to
declare, as a matter of common law or "judicial legisla-
tion," rules which may be necessary to fill in interstitially
or otherwise effectuate the statutory patterns enacted in
the large by Congress. In other words, it must mean
recognition of federal judicial competence to declare
the governing law in an area comprising issues substan-
tially related to an established program of government
operation.
22
Recognition of this broad basis for the exercise of judicial
power provides a rationale for the imposition of a wide range of
relief as long as it promotes the statutory purpose. Additionally,
the federal common law rationale provides a basis for the award
of relief irrespective of the grant of injunctive relief.23 Thus, in
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. ,24 the court
awarded rescission against one of the defendants, Bangor Punta
Corporation, which had sold stock in an exchange offer on the
basis of a materially misleading registration statement. This re-
medy was imposed despite the court's refusal to issue an injunc-
ing to reasons related to the substantive social policy embodied in an act of
positive law.
20 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
21 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Preamble, 48 Stat. 74.
22 Mishkin, supra note 18, at 799-800.
23 Imposition of an injunction against a defendant has important consequences
beyond the immediate effect of placing him in contempt should he violate the law in the
future. These consequences include disqualification from serving in various capacities in
connection with the management of an investment company, the unavailability of a "Reg.
A" exemption (a shorter procedure available for the registration of certain public offer-
ings of securities), and, for professionals practicing before the SEC, the possible tempor-
ary or permanent disqualification under rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice,
17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1974). See generally Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 5 REV. SEC.
REG. 969, 970-71 (1972).
24 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
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tion, though one was sought.25 Such an award is not without
precedent. In United States v. Moore,26 the Supreme Court
granted restitution for rental payments made in violation of simi-
larly worded rent control provisions of the Housing and Rent
Act of 194727 although no injunction could issue in that situation
because the property in question had been decontrolled.
It is clear that both the courts and the SEC are becoming
increasingly aware of this "quasi-legislative" power to impose
flexible and creative remedies to fit the violation charged.2 8 As a
practical matter, however, in some cases this power has de-
veloped with little formal judicial check on the SEC's discretion,
because a number of these newer remedies have emerged as a
result of negotiated consent decrees.
B. The Consent Decree Process
Consent decrees as a method of concluding litigation are
viewed as a necessity for the Commission, which has neither the
time nor the resources to litigate each case. 29 They are also a
speedy and efficient means by which to secure the immediate
cessation of illegal conduct and to impose the desired relief.
30
For the targets of the proceeding, there are many reasons to
agree to a settlement. Early settlements limit the extent of ad-
verse publicity, avoid more detailed elaboration of the proof un-
derlying the charge (which would be presented, for example, in
support of a preliminary injunction), may provide the opportun-
ity to negotiate who is named in the injunctive decree, and pre-
clude any possible collateral estoppel effects of the proceeding in
future private actions. 31 Additionally, because an unsuccessful
defense is not reimbursable from corporate funds, 32 the targets
have an incentive to avoid costly litigation.
2- Id. at 392. Similarly, in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified, 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972), certain defendants were ordered
to return proceeds made in a fraudulent public offering of stock although no injunction
was granted against them. Id. at 936.
26 340 U.S. 616 (1951).
27 Ch. 163, § 206(b), 61 Stat. 193. The provision under which the Administrator was
suing provided, "Whenever... any person has engaged or is about to engage in any act
or practice which constitutes or will constitute'a violation of subsection (a) of this section,
[the Administrator] may make application . . . for an order enjoining such act ... or for
an order enforcing compliance with such subsection .... "
2
' See, e.g., Sporkin, SEC Developments in Litigation and the Molding of Remedies, 29 Bus.
LAW. 121 (1974).
29 Cf. Gapay, When the SEC Slaps Your Wrist, Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1973, at 24, cols.
4-6; Mathews, supra note 4, at 955.
3 Cf. United States v. Carter Prods., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
31 Mathews, supra note 4, at 955.
2 See SEC v. Capital Counsellors, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 94,572 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (legal fees for unsuccessfully resisting a SEC action for
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Although the decision to enter into a consent decree is an
administrative act,33 the entry of the decree itself is an exercise
of judicial power.3 4 "By approving the consent judgment, the
court is adjudicating the plaintiff's right to relief and its extent,
both of which are essential elements of any judgment. '35 The
court must be satisfied that the decree is equitable, 36 that it af-
fords relief in the public interest, and that the violation will, in
fact, be remedied. Once there is consent to a decree, it can be
attacked on appeal only on the grounds of fraud, lack of actual
consent, or lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the court enter-
ing the decree. That a remedy could not be imposed if the case
were litigated is not ground for appeal.38 Finally, it is extremely
difficult for the defendant to secure modification of the decree
once it is entered.
3 9
Out of this process recently have come several new remedies
which are largely the creations of the SEC. Among these are
model corporate procedures, the appointment of special counsel,
and the appointment of interim directors. Although it is clear
that these new remedies are within the power of the SEC to
an injunction and appointment of a receiver not reimbursible out of the receivership
estate).
33 United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307.F. Supp. 617, 620 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
affd mem. sub nora., City of New York v. United States 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
'4 United States v. Carter Prods., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 144, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
3- SEC v. Thermodynamics, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1380, 1382 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 464
F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973).
3' United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
37 See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324 (1928); SEC v. Dennett,
429 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1970).
38 In Walling v. Miller, 138 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 784 (1944),
an action brought by the Administrator of the Wages and Hours Division, the court
refused to vacate a consent decree ordering restitution for back wages in an action under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1970), even though this remedy
had not been established as one which the administrator was empowered to bring.
Assuming, but not deciding, that the administrator is not authorized in the first
place to maintain a suit for restitution and that only the employees may do so,
the inclusion of the order for restitution in the consent decree did not go to the
jurisdiction or power of the court but to the merits only.
Id. at 631. Compare Communication Workers v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 479 (1960) (per curiam),
modifying 266 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1959), with NLRB v. Brandman Iron Co., 368 U.S. 399
(1962), rer'g 281 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1960). In the former, a litigated case, the Court
modified, as too broad, the injunction which had issued. In the latter case, equivalent
language was reinstated by the Court when the injunction had issued as a result of a
consent decree. Cf. Flynn, Consent Decrees in Antitrust Enforcement: Some Thoughts and
Proposals, 53 IOWA L. REV. 983, 985 (1968): "[P]rovisions of the decree based upon
erroneous factual or legal conclusions, provisions which enjoin intrastate activities, provi-
sions which are vague and general, and provisions which go beyond the scope of the
antitrust laws are barred from attack on appeal because of the defendant's consent to the
decree." But cJ. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129
(1967); Orth v. Transit Inv. Corp., 132 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1942).
3"See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
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negotiate and the courts to approve, they nonetheless present
problems which should be examined.
The appointment of interim directors is a drastic remedy in
that, like the equity receivership, it temporarily suspends the
power of a company's shareholders to choose its managers. It is
very different from that traditional remedy in that such direc-
tors, unlike equity receivers, have broad power to manage the
firm-power that appears to be coextensive with that of elected
directors; this increased power, however, seems to be subject to
substantially less supervision by the court entering the decree
authorizing appointed management. Moreover, provisions in
consent decrees themselves seem to give the SEC a voice in the
internal management of the company, as well as in the selection
of these appointed managers. Although it is clear that the SEC as
presently composed is one of the most effective and trusted fed-
eral agencies, it is equally clear that this may not always be the
case. It seems a wise precaution to establish proper standards for
the imposition of extensive new forms of relief before the failure
to have articulated standards leads to abuses of power.
The finality of the consent judgment, the private nature of
the negotiation process, and the lack of discussion by courts im-
posing many of the SEC's newer remedies combine to create
relationships among shareholders, appointed management, the
SEC, and the courts that need to be fully described and
analyzed.
II. REMEDIES THAT Do NOT DISPLACE ELECTED MANAGEMENT
A. Monetary Relief
Since Texas Gulf Sulphur, disgorgement of profits derived
from illegal insider trading has become a "regular" in the arsenal
of enforcement remedies. 40 (A recent variation of this remedy,
requested in SEC v. Penn Central Co.,4 1 seeks disgorgement of
profits, unrelated to insider trading, made through improper
diversion of corporate funds and improper corporate
agreements.) 42 The rationale for the imposition of this remedy is
that it promotes the statutory goals of the securities acts by en-
4 0 See, e.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 349 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1972, aff'd, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d
Cir. 1974); SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 92,504 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
41 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,527 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
42 Cf the recent consent decrees in the illegal political contribution cases wherein the
targets agreed to reimburse the company for illegal payments which they caused the
company to make. Notes 60-62 infra & accompanying text.
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suring integrity in securities transactions and, in some instances,
by encouraging disclosure as well.43 (If an insider wishes to trade
he must disclose all material inside information.) Additionally,
this remedy is important both for its deterrent effect on future
misconduct, by guaranteeing that no one may profit by
wrongdoing,44 and because it makes provision for compensation
to the victims of fraud through the appointment of agents to
receive the money and administer it to defrauded claimants.
45
There are other monetary remedies which similarly pro-
mote the statutory purposes by encouraging disclosure, ensuring
integrity, deterring future misconduct, and compensating vic-
tims. In SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc. 46 the district court
ordered rescission and restitution of proceeds for the benefit of
purchasers in a faulty public offering. Similarly, requests for
restitution and an accounting against an investment company
were approved in SEC v. Quing N. Wong.47
The remedies employed to grant monetary relief are basi-
cally the historical ones of restitution and rescission. The power
to impose these remedies has been fully litigated, and, generally,
the courts have attempted to articulate the functions which they
are intended to serve; it is clear that they are well within the
traditional power of equity to grant restorative relief.48 The
principal problems in this area are now those of detail, such as
problems of administration of the money collected 49 or the ex-
tent of the relief to be granted.50 Other remedies, however, have
43 See Comment, supra note 13, at 956.
4' See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257, 259 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (Weinfeld, J.) ("The injunction against future violations, while of some deterrent
force, is only a partial remedy since it does not correct the consequences of past con-
duct.")
45 SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
46340 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified, 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
47 254 F. Supp. 66 (D.P.R. 1966). Cf. SEC v. Parvin Dohrmann Co., 81 BNA SEC.
REG. & L. REP. A-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (defendant insiders, consenting to an injunction,
ordered to disgorge all profits made in an illegal takeover attempt); SEC v. Gulf Inter-
continental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963) (offending companies ordered
liquidated with a pro rata distribution to investors).
4 See 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 9, § 910.
"See, e.g., SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (un-
claimed profits previously disgorged by insiders were to be deposited with the court
under 28 U.S.C. § 2041-42 (1970) for the benefit of future claimants).
"See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
nodified, 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972) (trial court ordered that income and profits
derived from the proceeds of the public offering be disgorged as well as the proceeds
themselves; appellate court struck down this part of the order as punitive. 458 F.2d at
1104-05). See also SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974) (affirming the trial
court's method of determining the amount of illegal profits).
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been imposed without hearing or opinion, and thus have no
articulated basis for the exercise of judicial power.
B. Model Corporate Procedures
The most interesting of the newer remedies which the SEC
has been imposing by way of consent decree is the mandating of
special corporate procedures specifically designed to prevent re-
currence of the violation charged. Under this type of decree, a
company agrees under court order to set up special committees
or to implement statements of policy which, if complied with, are
expected to internalize various safeguards which will effectuate
the provisions of the injunction that has issued.51
Several recent cases present good examples of this type of
remedy. In SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,52 the company was
charged with selling Penn Central commercial paper to the pub-
lic without adequately disclosing the financial condition of the
company or the risks involved in the purchase of the securities.
In the consent decree, Goldman Sachs agreed to implement a
statement of policy with regard to its dealings in commercial
paper and agreed that this statement would not be altered with-
out securing Commission approval. This statement included
commitments that (a) before dealing in any commercial paper,
Goldman Sachs would conduct an investigation to ascertain that
the security was validly issued and that it complied with applica-
ble registration requirements; (b) before recommending the sec-
urity, the company would have reasonable grounds to believe
that the issuer would have the ability to redeem the paper at
maturity; and (c) Goldman Sachs would receive copies of all
reports filed by the issuer with the SEC or reasonably compara-
ble information if no filings were required.53 This policy was
calculated to assure compliance with the fiduciary obligation of
rendering sound investment advice which the Commission seeks
5 In a related context, the Commission has been requiring the adoption of special
internal controls in the settlement of proceedings under rule 2(e) of the Commission's
Rules of Practice, 17 C.F-.R. § 201.2(e) (1974). In Touche Ross & Co., 4 CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 72,175 (Feb. 25, 1974), the settlement order provided that Touche Ross set up
procedures designed to determine "management's direct or indirect involvement in ma-
terial transactions which are included in the financial statements," and to ensure that
periodic review of the quality of audits was conducted at least every two years. See also In
re Jo M. Ferguson, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974), and the action
against Benjamin Botwinick & Co., an accounting firm, wherein the target company
agreed that over the next 5 years, each of its partners would attend 40 hours annually of
courses and seminars in subjects related to the accounting profession. Wall St. J., Jan. 15,
1975, at 19, col. 2.
52 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,556 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
53 Id.
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to enforce against brokerage firms 5 4 and was specifically tailored
to protect the public in its dealings with Goldman Sachs.
The SEC has not hesitated to mandate special procedures
for companies other than broker-dealers. Teleprompter Corpo-
ration, an operator of cable television systems, recently con-
sented to an injunction against issuing false and misleading press
releases and annual reports.55 Apparently satisfied that the
company's failure to disclose that it was reducing its construction
program was caused by inadequate "internal financial controls
and procedures," rather than by intentional fraud, 56 the SEC
accepted new financial monitoring and reporting techniques as
part of the consent decree. These new procedures required the
preparation of operating and capital budget forecasts on a
reasonably current basis; they also included the safeguard of
furnishing the SEC with an affidavit describing the procedures
accompanied by a letter from the auditor confirming that such
procedures had in fact been implemented.57 This settlement was
clearly aimed at the specific problem of identifying anticipated
cutbacks in capital expansion programs at an early stage and
assuring full disclosure to the public. This specific failure to
disclose was the precise problem for which Teleprompter had
been cited.
The consent decree in SEC v. Lums, Inc. 58 went one step
further than the Teleprompter order, in that it actually man-
dated the disclosures which had to be made in any subsequent
registration or proxy statement issued in connection with the
future acquisition of any gambling casino. Included among the
required disclosures were who controlled the acquired business
and the material consideration, in addition to the purchase price,
to be paid for the acquired business. These disclosures were
supplemented by a proscription against the inclusion of unau-
dited financials of the acquired company unless assurances of
their fairness were received from independent auditors. 59 This
order was an attempt to assure the accuracy of proxy and regist-
ration statements issued by Lums in connection with future ac-
quisitions.
" See, e.g., In re Alexander Reid & Co., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 76,823 (SEC 1962); cf. Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J,.
concurring).
SEC %'. Teleprompter Corp., 262 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
5 Wall St. J., July 16, 1974, at 7, cols. 2-3.
17 SEC v. Teleprompter Corp., 262 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" (1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,504 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
59 Id.
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Companies that have filed false financial reports to cover up
their illegal campaign contributions may become targets of en-
forcement actions in the future.60 In the first such campaign
contribution case, the Commission negotiated a consent decree
with American Ship Building Company in which the corporation
agreed to disclose the illegality and to set up a special review
committee made up of two independent directors and a chair-
man, unaffiliated with the company, to study the company's
books to determine the extent of misused corporate funds, and
to remedy these violations. 61 The expectation of the Commission
is that this special committee will remedy past improprieties and
set up a system to prevent recurrence of such illegality.
6 2
Further, the SEC has indicated that corporations that have failed
to disclose illegal campaign contributions may adopt the proce-
dures mandated in the American Ship Building Company court
order and thereby SEC action against them.6 3
The provisions mandated by each of these consent decrees
are attempts by the Commission to establish ongoing procedures
which will ensure corporate compliance with federally created
obligations. That enforcement of the securities laws is creating a
federal law of substantive corporate duties and responsibilities
which supplements and often exceeds the requirements of state
law is well-documented.6 4 Mandating special corporate proce-
dures by court order contributes to this already substantial body
of federal law in several ways. The immediate effect of this kind
of remedy is to restructure certain aspects of corporate proce-
dure on pain of contempt. The larger result is that the SEC is
building up a body of approved model corporate procedures
(including special committees to oversee various aspects of the
60 See Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1974, at 13, col. 1.
6 Id. In addition, the company chairman agreed to repay any illegally contributed
funds.
" See Wall St.J., Feb. 3, 1975, at 4, col. 1, reporting a consent decree negotiated with
the Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company enjoining the company, its chairman,
and two former officers from using-corporate funds for illegal campaign purposes, from
filing false reports with the SEC, and from establishing secret funds. The company
agreed to the appointment of a special agent, approved by the Commission, to "investi-
gate and report on any other instances in which the company disguised the real use of
corporate funds."
63 The order ... spells out the actions other illegal corporate contributors
should take if they want to avoid SEC action. SEC officials have said that any
company convicted of making illegal gifts should disclose the wrongdoing, set
tip procedures to make sure it doesn't happen again and require the repayment
of any corporate funds.
Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1974, at 13, col. 1.
64 See, e.g., Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146
(1965).
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business, approved statements of policy, and approved items for
inclusion in proxy or registration statements) which can be taken
as guides to all companies in their efforts to meet federal law.
The SEC has not gone uncriticized for having fostered the
creation of an unreasonably high level of corporate re-
sponsibility.6 5 Mandating model procedures is a creative way for
the SEC to show that these expectations are not unrealistic.
These "approved" procedures could have the effect of shifting
the burden of proof in subsequent private actions against target
companies that had failed to comply with the court orders
against them. Alternatively, the institution of and compliance
with these model procedures in a non-target company might
provide evidence of having complied with the duty of due care.
The remedies discussed in this section are well within the
statutory grant of authority to the SEC and the courts "to en-
force any liability or duty" created by the securities acts. The
special procedures have been specifically designed to remedy the
precise violation charged. If the SEC has the power to request
injunctions against future violations, surely its ancillary power
should include the ability to mandate procedures to ensure fu-
ture compliance. Management that has failed to set up proce-
dures which successfully ensure compliance with the law may
appropriately be ordered to implement changes which will pro-
tect the public in dealing with its securities.
III. REMEDIES THAT DISPLACE ELECTED MANAGEMENT
Another type of remedy which the SEC has successfully re-
quested is the appointment of a variety of special agents en-
dowed with power to redress past violations, to bring the com-
pany into compliance with applicable law, and to prevent future
wrongdoing. In this category are receivers, and, it will be ar-
gued, what are essentially variations of this remedy-special
counsel and interim directors.
The appointment of a receiver is a traditional tool of equity
courts. 66 The Commission staff maintains that its success in ob-
taining equity receiverships in appropriate cases indicates that its
power must extend as well to less extreme forms of relief,
namely the appointment of special counsel and interim
directors. 67 In imposing remedies short of receivership, the
6" For a discussion of the major criticisms in this area, see id. 1172-73.
66 See generally 1 R. CLARK, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF RECEIVERS §§ 1-10 (3d ed.
1959).
67 Sporkin, supra note 28, at 123.
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Commission hopes to preserve the corporate entity as a viable
business by avoiding the inflexibility and adverse public reaction
which invariably accompany the institution of a receivership
while preserving the protections which inhere in that remedy.
A. Receivers
A receiver is an officer of the court who stands neutral
among all parties and whose primary function is the protection
of the property within his control from waste or mismanage-
ment.6 8 The institution of a receivership is a drastic remedy, to
be imposed only as a last resort.69 Requisite to its imposition are
findings by the court of fraud, mismanagement, and imminent
danger of waste should existing management remain in con-
trol. 70 It is primarily a holding measure, the purpose of which
normally is the marshaling and preservation of assets pending
some ultimate action such as liquidation or reorganization.
7 '
Often in SEC enforcement cases, however, no such ultimate
action is contemplated, and a receiver is appointed simply to
bring a company into compliance with all applicable law, as by
causing a full audit to be made and by making all required dis-
closures.
72
As an officer of the court,73 the receiver is a fiduciary and is
held to the highest standard of undivided loyalty.74 However,
the receiver may assure himself of protection in the exercise of
his duties by applying to the court which appointed him for
direction. 75 Indeed, he is dutybound to receive direction from
68 4J. POMEROY, supra note 9, § 1330.
"See, e.g., Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665, 674 (2d Cir. 1961).
70 See, e.g., SEC v. Bowler, 427 F.2d 190, 198 (4th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Keller Corp.,
323 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1963); cf. SEC v. Bennett & Co., 207 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J.
1962) (refusing to appoint a receiver).
7! See, e.g., SEC v. Diversified Brokers Co., 305 F. Supp. 950, 952-53 (E.D. Mo.
1969): "This SEC receivership is designed and intended as a holding action, conserving
and collecting assets pending the proper final disposition. Since the passage of time
works against the conservation of, and against the ability to collect assets, immediate
action is necessitated."
72See, e.g., SEC v. S & P Nat'l Corp., 360 F.2d 741, 750-51 (2d Cir. 1966): "[The
purpose of this receivership is] to install a responsible officer of the court who could
bring the companies into compliance with the law, 'ascertain the true state of affairs...
and report thereon' to the court and public shareholders and preserve the corporate
assets."
71 Crites, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 322 U.S. 408 (1944).
71 Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 154 F.2d 978, 991 (2d Cir. 1946): "A receiver,
as 'an officer or arm of the court,' is a trustee with the highest kind of fiduciary obliga-
tions. He owes a duty of strict impartiality, of 'undivided loyalty,' to all persons interested
in the receivership estate, and must not 'dilute' that loyalty." See 16 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7811 (rev. ed. 1962).
" See Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 276 (9th Cir. 1964), ceilt.
denied, 380 U.S. 956 (1965); 16 W. FLETCHER, supra note 74, § 7864.
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the court prior to taking any action on an important matter.7 6
To attack the conduct of a receiver is to attack the integrity of
the court itself.7 7 In all cases, a receiver for a corporation is
bound by applicable state law. 8
Because a receivership is primarily a measure designed to
preserve the status quo, it is ill-adapted to the continuation of an
ongoing business. 7' The receiver, bound to represent the in-
terests of all parties in the receivership estate,80 is not normally
authorized to carry on a business in a speculative way.81
The ability of the Commission to obtain equity receivers in
appropriate cases is well-established. 82 Although the remedy was
initially confined to cases of insolvent broker-dealers, 83 the courts
have been willing to apply it to other kinds of companies, 84 irre-
spective of solvency.
85
Although the Supreme Court has not directly faced the
power of courts to impose equity receiverships as an enforce-
ment remedy, the power to obtain receivers has been sustained
with respect to a private litigant suing under the Securities Act of
1933.86 In a suit seeking an injunction, rescission, and the ap-
pointment of a receiver on the ground that the defendant was
guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation in the advertisement and
sale of securities, the Court stated:
[T]he Act as a whole indicates an intention to establish a
statutory right which the litigant may enforce in desig-
nated courts by such legal or equitable actions or proce-
dures as would normally be available to him. . . . [I]n
7' See 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 9, § 1336.
77 Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 154 F.2d 978, 1000 (2d Cir. 1946).
7 S5ee 16 W. FLETCHER, supra note 74, § 7813.
7'See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 98 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1938):
In the absence of special authority, a receiver has no power to continue to
carry on a private business of which he is appointed receiver .... The court, in
its discretion, may permit a receiver to continue the conduct of a business tem-
porarily, when the interests of the parties seem to require it, but it is said that
the court should move "with-great caution in conferring such authority and
exposing the property to the hazards of business;" and such action is justified
only when clearly necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties.
8" 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 9, § 1331.
" Northwest Marine Works v. United States, 307 F.2d 537, 542 (9th Cir. 1962).
"2 See, e.g., SEC v. Bowler, 427 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1970); SEC v. S & P Nat'l. Corp.,
360 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1966); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285
F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960).
83 See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1508-14 (2d ed. 1961).
" See, e.g., SEC v. Bowler, 427 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1970) (a small loan business).
"See, e.g., Bailey v. Proctor, 160 F.2d 78, 82 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 834
(1947).
"6 Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
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section 22(a) . . . specified courts are given jurisdiction
"of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this subchapter."
The power to enforce implies the power to make effec-
tive the right of recovery afforded by the Act. And the
power to make the right of recovery effective implies
the power to utilize any of the procedures or actions
normally available to the litigant according to the ex-
igencies of the particular case.8 7
The cited language is equally applicable to actions instituted by
the Commission "to enforce any liability or duty created" by the
Securities Acts. If present management cannot be trusted to
comply with an injunction, the appointment of a receiver be-
comes necessary to make effective the injunctive decree and to
bring a company into compliance with applicable law. In such a
case the SEC may appropriately request the remedy and the
court has the power and discretion to grant it.
Despite its well-established power to obtain receiverships in
appropriate cases, the Commission is often reluctant to enforce
this remedy.8 8 One reason, mentioned above as a consequence of
the requirement, that he represent all interests in the receiver-
ship estate, is the inability of the receiver to operate the company
aggressively. The principal drawback of this remedy, however, is
the negative public reaction consequent to its institution. The
appointment of a receiver is often a sharp blow to customer and
investor confidence. Courts are not unmindful of the public-
relations impact of this remedy. In Los Angeles Trust Deed &
Mortgage Exchange v. SEC,s 9 in which a receiver was appointed at
the request of the SEC, the court said: "It is appreciated that the
conservator type of receivership which we have insisted upon is
not well adapted to a business the very essence of which is prom-
otion and, apparently, depends on a constant inflow of new
business." 90 Again, in SEC v. Bowler,9' the court conceded:
We do not question the strength of defendants' ar-
guments that some plan of reorganization of the corpo-
rate defendants is probably preferable to the appoint-
ment of a receiver. The latter carries connotations
which may be ruinous in an industry where ready access
87 Id. at 287-88 (emphasis in original).
88 See generally Sporkin, supra note 28.
s' 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
90 Id. at 182.
91 427 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1970).
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to borrowed funds is a condition precedent to profitable
operation and where prompt payment of receivables is
essential.
92
The effect of this remedy on creditors, alluded to in Bowler,
may be even more direct. A provision found in many loan
agreements provides that the appointment of a receiver will con-
stitute a condition of default and thus cause the loan to fall
due.93 Such a triggering of any substantial loan may, of course,
be ruinous to a business.
Courts have struggled with this problem in private actions,
attempting to structure relief to accomplish the goals of protec-
tion of investors or creditors from further wasting of assets with-
out totally destroying the ongoing business in the process. In
Adelman v. CGS Scientific Corp., an action for rescission of a sale
of one corporation to another which was alleged to have been
fraudulently induced, the court appointed a "custodian" who
was authorized to hold the assets of the company for fifty-nine
days; this avoided a condition in a loan agreement which pro-
vided that the appointment of a receiver for sixty consecutive
days would be a ground for acceleration of the loan.95 And in
Roach v. Margulies,96 the trial court appointed a fiscal agent
" 'with full power and authority to check the propriety of all
disbursements to be made or proposed to be made or proposed
to be made by the corporation.' ,,97 If the agent questioned any
disbursement he was to report to the parties who could then
apply to the court for relief. The appellate court sustained this
remedy as an ingenious device "contrived to avoid more string-
ent measures" and thus "to avoid injuring the business in its
relations with the public and its large number of subscribers.
98
Thus, courts have long been willing to mold their decrees in
private actions to minimize the possibility of harm when the
goals of protection could be adequately served through means
less drastic than the appointment of a receiver. Recently, in en-
forcement actions, the SEC has been attempting to construct
92 Id. at 196.
93 See generally Sporkin, supra note 28.
91 332 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
95 Id. at 151-52.
96 42 N.J. Super. 243, 126 A.2d 45 (App. Div. 1956).
97 Id. at 245, 126 A.2d at 46.
98 Id. at 246, 126 A.2d at 47. Cf. SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972)
(appointing a "limited receiver" inter alia to supervise public disclosures, to investigate
and make a public report on certain secret securities transactions, and to make prepara-
tion for and hold a shareholders' meeting to elect new directors).
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remedies which avoid the inflexibility and adverse connotations
which are inherent in the traditional remedy of receivership.
B. Directors Appointed or Approved by the Court
1. Use of the Remedy in Practice
Recent consent decrees in enforcement actions have in-
cluded, in various forms, the appointment of independent direc-
tors who are satisfactory to the SEC and approved by the court.
This remedy, like the receivership, temporarily suspends the
traditional power of the stockholders (at least with respect to
these directors) to choose the management of their company.
SEC v. Mattel, Inc. 99 is one example of the way in which this
remedy has been imposed. On August 5, 1974, Mattel consented
to an order permanently enjoining it from securities fraud viola-
tions. As part of this order, it agreed to add to its board two
court-approved directors, unaffiliated with Mattel and satisfac-
tory to the Commission, and to set up two special committees
composed in part of these new directors to review accounting
procedures, to supervise the accuracy of financial disclosures
and reports issued from the company, and to study the possibil-
ity of legal action against past or present officers of the
company.'0 0 On November 26, 1974, the court, at the behest of
the SEC, amended the order to require that Mattel name a ma-
jority of independent, SEC-approved directors to its board; these
additional directors were ordered to appoint a special counsel
satisfactory to the SEC, and approved by the court. 101 The
amendment was prompted by additional disclosures to the SEC
indicating that overstatement of profits and understatement of
losses had occurred at least since 1971 (rather than for only the
1973 fiscal year, as originally thought), and that the company
might be vulnerable to private class action litigation already insti-
tuted alleging fraud in the sale of securities. 0 2 It was the opinion
of the SEC, and the court agreed, that Mattel should be con-
trolled by new, independent management.
The Mattel case is an excellent example of the flexibility of
this new remedy, which allows the courts to institute a specific
11 264 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. A- 11, 12 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 1974).
1
00 Id.
101 Civil No. 74-2958 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 26, 1974). The case was transferred from
the District of Columbia to the Central District of California after the entry of an
amended order on October 2, 1974, which embodied essentially the same relief as the
order of November 26. Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1974, at 4, cols. 2-4.
102 Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1974, at 4, cols. 2-4.
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type of control-tailored to the offense charged-which may be
altered as circumstances change. The original order was issued
on the assumption that publication of incorrect financial figures
would not be repeated because all disclosures and accounting
and control procedures would thereafter be reviewed by inde-
pendent outsiders. When additional information made it appear
that the false financials were the result of fraud, the agency
requested that the role of existing management be curtailed and
that control be given to independent outsiders whom the court
and the SEC deemed to be acceptable.
10 3
The court appointment of interim directors who are satis-
factory to the Commission has been mandated by several other
recent consent decrees.10 4 This appointment has been coupled
with the mandatory resignation of existing management, as in
SEC v. Vesco, 105 or has been imposed although existing manage-
ment was allowed to remain, as in SEC v. Coastal States Gas
Corp.106 In the latter case the order provided simply that a ma-
jority of the board be court-appointed. Although the decrees
vary somewhat, they basically provide that the board of the en-
joined company be composed partly or entirely of members in-
dependent of the company.'0 7 This board is to have "full power
under applicable corporate law to conduct the affairs" of the
company.' 08 They are to serve
until further order of this Court upon the application
of plaintiff Commission and until the shareholders ...
have elected a new board of directors . . . . No indi-
vidual director appointed pursuant to this provision-
shall be discharged or replaced or any additional direc-
tors be appointed or elected except upon application to
103 Id.
"4 See, e.g., SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corp., Civil No. 73-H-1262 (S.D. Tex., Sept.
11, 1973); SEC v. Clinton Oil Co., Civil No. W-5020 (D. Kan., Mar. 16, 1973); SEC v.
Vesco, 72 Civ. 5001 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 16, 1973). Two additional consent decrees provided
for court-appointed interim directors, but these companies are currently in Chapter X
proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act. SEC v. Westgate-California Corp., Civil No.
72-217-N (S.D. Cal., May 29, 1973); SEC v. Equity Funding Corp., Civil No. 73-714-HP
(C.D. Cal., Apr. 3, 1973).
1" 72 Civ. 5001 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 16, 1973).
1"6 Civil No. 73-H-1262 (S.D. Tex., Sept. 11, 1973). Cf. text accompanying notes
99-103 supra.
,07 See, e.g., Memorandum of Terms of Settlement 4(b), SEC v. Clinton Oil Co.,
Civil No. V-5020 (D. Kan., Mar. 8, 1973).
'18 See, e.g., Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction and Appointment of Special
Counsel and Directors 4, SEC v. Vesco, 72 Civ. 5001 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 16, 1973).
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this Court by plaintiff Commission in accordance with
the provisions of this paragraph. 10 9
Additionally, each such director "shall not be liable for any ac-
tion taken or omitted to be taken by him or for any error in
judgment made in good faith by him in his capacity as interim
Director unless it shall be proved that he was grossly negligent in
connection with such action, omission or judgment. . .. ",10
Thus, by court order and at the Commission's request, a
board of directors that cannot be voted out or removed by nor-
mal shareholder action is installed, and is accountable only for
actions which are grossly negligent. Initially, it seems anomalous
that the Commission, which has had as a major goal the expan-
sion of shareholder democracy' and the creation of a higher
standard of accountability for corporate management, 1 2 should
have sponsored the creation of this remedy which appears to be
at odds with those policies. The anomaly is, however, more ap-
parent than real.
An analysis of this remedy shows that these provisions are
the result of efforts to modify the equity receivership remedy to
preserve its virtues while eliminating its drawbacks of inflexibility
and adverse public and creditor reaction. Appointment of inde-
pendent agents called "directors," who will serve for a time with-
out standing for election and who need not worry about per-
sonal liability for actions short of gross negligence, is an attempt
to provide the freedom from liability and the full control of a
receiver while at the same time providing for a measure of flexi-
bility not available under that more traditional remedy. A com-
parison of the receivership remedy with the appointment of in-
terim directors will highlight the reasons for these provisions.
2. Comparison of Remedies
The orders consenting to the appointment of interim direc-
tors provide that they shall have full power to conduct the affairs
of the company "under applicable corporate law." Rather than
being agents of the court with carefully delineated powers, as are
equity receivers,"13 these directors operate as traditional agents
and managers of the company. They may take risks, sell or ac-
109 Id.
1'Iold. 4(ii).
... Cf. Proposals of security holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1974).
12 Cf. Address by Commissioner Sommer, American Bar Association, in 267 BNA
SEC. REG. & L. REP. G-1-5 (Aug. 28, 1974).
13 Text accompanying note 68 supra.
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quire assets, negotiate with creditors, and, in short, do what is
necessary to manage the "business and affairs" of the
company. 114 They may do all this, presumably, without applying
to the court for direction. To substitute for the cloak of protec-
tion which court approval provides for the receiver, 115 the order
prescribes a "gross negligence" standard of care to which these
directors will be held accountable. Because there is continuing
jurisdiction in the court to oversee various provisions of the
decree," 6 and because it has been held, in connection with a
receivership proceeding, that the SEC remains a party and may
apply to the court to enforce compliance with the decree or to
bring evidence of misbehavior to the court's attention," 7 the
shareholder will still be protected. What has changed, of course,
is that given the gross negligence standard, effective protection
now lies in the court or the SEC rather than in the shareholder's
own private legal action.
The result, then, of the institution of interim directorships is
that, as in a receivership, the existing management is ousted or
effectively precluded from further control;" 8 there is continuing
surveillance by the SEC and the court of the operation of the
business; and the company continues to function, vis-A-vis the
public, subject to the provisions of applicable law. Unlike a re-
ceivership, however, the interim board has broad and flexible
powers to manage the company without going to the court for
approval.
C. Special Counsel
Another agent, whose appointment the SEC has been secur-
ing with some regularity, is special counsel." 9 His designation
114 Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (Supp. 1971).
115 Text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
"6 See, e.g., Memorandum of Terms of Settlement 18, SEC v. Clinton Oil Co.,
Civil No. W-5020 (D. Kan., Mar. 8, 1973): "[T]he Court shall retain jurisdiction with
respect to all matters relating to the implementation, accomplishment and enforcement
of the acts to be done pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement and to make
such orders as may be necessary and appropriate in connection therewith ...
117 East v. Crowdus, 302 F.2d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1962).
The interest of the [SEC] in such an action [appointment of a receiver] does not
terminate upon the appointment of a receiver therein. Under Section 78u of the
1934 Act... the Commission is authorized to apply to the Federal Courts in aid
of enforcement of the powers vested in it .... Certainly, if ... the Commission
should learn of any unconscionable malfeasance or neglect on the part of the
receiver, no court would hold that the Commission was without standing to
bring such matters to the appointing court's attention ....
118 Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock of Ind., 227 F.
Supp. 208, 216-17 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
"9 See, e.g., SEC v. Holiday Magic, Inc., Civil No. C 73 1095 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 2, 1974);
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1188
often accompanies the court appointment of interim directors,
and his role in reordering the enterprise is essentially to investi-
gate the financial affairs of the company, 120 to oversee a full
accounting of all the transactions, 12 1 and to take any legal actions
warranted by the results of these investigations.
112
Special counsel appointed for the International Controls
Corporation (ICC) has brought one such action pursuant to his
mandate in SEC v. Vesco.' 23 ICC is part of the beleaguered finan-
cial enterprise of the now-famous Robert Vesco. Special counsel
brought suit against forty-two individual and corporate defen-
dants who had allegedly aided Vesco in his scheme to defraud a
number of Vesco-controlled companies, including ICC, resulting
in the defendants' control of "over $200 million deposited in
banks located in countries ranging geographically from Luxem-
bourg to Costa Rica."' 2 4 In that suit, ICC secured a preliminary
injunction against the disposition of certain assets claimed by
ICC-including a pleasure yacht used exclusively by Vesco and
his family, an astonishingly well-equipped Boeing 707 aircraft,
and over 800,000 shares of ICC stock transferred by Vesco and
his family to an alter ego, Vesco and Co.'
2 5
The incredible complexity of the fraud alleged in the Vesco
case, and the obvious need for rapid action to protect ICC and
the public from further diversion of corporate assets beyond the
borders of this country, provide an excellent example of the
need for a special agent to investigate the company's affairs and
to take quick legal action. Indeed, the International Controls Corp.
v. Vesco suit was instituted within three months of ICC's consent
to the injunction and appointment of special counsel.'
26
This power to bring suit on behalf of a corporation for
fraud or waste is normally vested in the board of directors of the
company itself, or, if the board will not act, in the stockholders
by way of a derivative suit. Empowering a special agent to bring
SEC v. Clinton Oil Co., Civil No. W-5020 (D. Kan., Mar. 16, 1973); SEC v. Vesco, 72 Civ.
5001 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 16, 1973).
120 Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction and Appointment of Special Counsel
and Directors 3(a), SEC v. Vesco, 72 Civ. 5001 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 16, 1973).
121 See, e.g., Memorandum of Terms of Settlement 10(a), SEC v. Clinton Oil Co.,
Civil No. W-5020 (D. Kan., Mar. 8, 1973).
122 Id. at 110(b).
123 International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 932 (1974).124 1d. at 1338-39.
125 Id. at 1338.
126 Entry of the injunction was March 16, 1973, and the subsequent suit was in-
stituted June 7, 1973, id. at 1340.
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such suits represents a significant departure from the traditional
scheme created by state law. The orders appointing these agents
give them full power to institute all legal proceedings subject
only to notification of or consultation with the board of directors
with respect to their intentions, 27 or in one case, subject to a
prior demand on directors.
128
In essence, this power is no different from the power often
given to equity receivers in enforcement actions to aid them in
the marshaling and preservation of assets.' 29 To the extent that
special counsel acts as a receiver under the court's supervi-
sion, the remedy is simply a modified form of an equity
receivership. 130 There is, however, an extremely important way
in which this remedy differs from a receivership order.
Although the board of directors has relatively little power to
prevent special counsel from prosecuting claims, the SEC has
significant power in this regard. The court order in SEC v. Vesco
provides that special counsel "shall neither decline to pursue any
claim ... , nor settle any claims, against the recommendation of
plaintiff Commission and without the approval of this Court
.... "131 The order appointing special counsel in SEC v. Holiday
Magic, Inc. provides that "[t]he Commission retains the right to
oppose the pursuit of any claim where it believes investors' in-
terests would not be served by the pursuance of such claim."'
3 2
These provisions give the SEC broad power to control the deci-
127 Memorandum of Terms of Settlement 10(c), SEC v. Clinton Oil Co., Civil No.
W-5020 (D. Kan., Mar. 8, 1973).
128 Consent Judgment of Permanent Injunction and Appointment of Special Coun-
sel Ill-B, SEC v. Holiday Magic, Inc., Civil No. C 73 1095 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 2, 1974).
Special Counsel shall, after consulting with corporate counsel of the Corporate
Defendants, request the board of directors of the appropriate companies to
authorize and direct management to institute the suit. If the board of directors
fails to honor the Special Counsel's request within 15 days of the request or if
management or its counsel fails to institute the suit expeditiously, the Special
Counsel shall be authorized to institute and pursue the suit on behalf of the
company.
129 See text accompanying note 136 infra.
130 It should be noted that special counsel has been given the same immunity from
liability, except for actions which are grossly negligent, as that discussed in connection
with the appointment of interim directors. Text accompanying notes 110-117 supra. In
the case of special counsel, however, the need for flexibility and freedom from court
supervision is not as compelling as in the case of temporary directors, and this provision
seems to be an unnecessary dilution of accountability. Realistically, it is likely that in both
cases the provision is included as an inducement to get well-qualified people to serve in
often difficult situations.
13 Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction and Appointment of Special Counsel
and Directors 3(b), SEC v. Vesco, 72 Civ. 5001 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 16, 1973).
132 Consent Judgment of Permanent Injunction and Appointment of Special Coun-
sel Il-B, SEC v. Holiday Magic, Inc., Civil No. C 73 1095 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 2, 1974).
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sions made with respect to the prosecution and settlement of
claims against the target company and its officers. This kind of
substantive control over the business decisions of the company is
probably an unwarranted and presently unjustified extension of
the SEC's power over corporations.
Another provision in the order in Holiday Magic presents a
similar problem. That order provides: "The Corporate Defen-
dants shall not expand their operations to a new product line or
business not now in existence without approval of the Special
Counsel.' 33 It is very difficult to understand why special counsel
needs to be given this approval power as ancillary to an injunc-
tive decree that enjoins defendants from selling securities in
connection with a pyramiding scheme "unless the products or
services of the corporate defendants are rendered in substantial
degree to consumers .... "134 Nor is it clear that such power
effectuates the statutory purposes of the securities acts, which
seek to regulate securities sold by business and not the business
itself.
D. Why Establish These New Remedies?
There seem to be two basic reasons for the efforts to find
substitutes for the equity receiver. The first has to do with the
much greater efficiency of an appointed board of directors in
rapidly taking the steps necessary to put a defendant company in
order. Frequently, firms that have been the subject of fraudulent
and manipulative management are on the brink of insolvency. A
traditional receiver appointed by a court would be restrained in
his attempts to salvage the situation both by his duty to represent
all interested parties in a neutral manner, and by the necessity of
obtaining court approval for all but the most routine decisions.
An appointed board of directors would be free to negotiate
loans, sales of assets, and other organic changes in the structure
of the business necessary to salvage all or a part of it as an
ongoing enterprise.
This degree of flexibility may be an appropriate and neces-
sary ingredient of any remedy which is designed to keep a com-
pany viable while providing a means for ascertaining the current
state of affairs and for bringing the company into compliance
with applicable law. It is not at all clear, however, that this pur-
pose could not be achieved by means of a receivership which was
subject to less supervision by the court, but which also had less
133 Id. VI-C.
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power to change the corporate structure in fundamental ways.
For example, the receiver in SEC v. Arkansas Loan & Thrift
Corp. 3 5 was authorized inter alia:
to continue, manage and operate the business of the
defendants, until the further order of this court, with
full authority to carry on, manage and operate the said
business, to buy and sell merchandise, supplies or stock
in trade for cash or on credit, and as may be deemed
advisable by such receiver... to employ such managers,
agents, employees, servants, accountants, and attorneys
as may in his judgment be advisable or necessary in the
management, conduct, control or custody of the affairs
of the defendants . . to make such payments and dis-
bursements as may be needful and proper for the pre-
servation of the properties of the defendants . . . to
receive and collect any and all sums of money due or
owing to the defendants... to institute, prosecute and
defend, compromise, adjust, intervene in or become
party to [court] actions . . . as may in his opinion be
necessary or proper for the protection, maintenance
and preservation of the assets of the defendants .... 1
36
This receivership order would seem to encompass most actions
that a director would want to take in the exercise of his duties.
What a receiver is precluded from under such an order is
wholesale reorganization of the business. He probably could not
sell off a substantial part of the assets or change a line of busi-
ness. These are actions which the interim board presumably
could take and which could be accomplished without the normal
requirements of accountability and direction that are provided
by shareholder election of management and by the threat of
shareholder derivative suits.
The efficiency argument mentioned above may justify the
greater power vested in appointed directors to manage the com-
pany, depending upon the severity of the situation and the need
for quick action, but it also illustrates that such appointments are
possibly an even more drastic remedy to seek and impose than
the equity receivership.
What seems to be at the heart of these new remedies, how-
ever, is the desire to cause minimal disruption to the ongoing
13 294 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Ark. 1969).
136 Id. at 1237.
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operation of a company. It is apparently felt that the imposition
of something called a receivership will cause creditors and inves-
tors far more alarm than the appointment of agents with more
familiar names-temporary directors and special counsel.
There are, in fact, many kinds of receivers. 137 A receiver
may be appointed to preserve property during the course of
litigation or in aid of a final decree. He may be directed to take
charge of some of the assets of a corporation or of the corpora-
tion itself. A receiver may be directed to liquidate a company or
to preserve assets pending some future action, and, perhaps
most significant in the present context, a receiver may be ap-
pointed pursuant to a statute or by the inherent equity power of
the court.
Very often the appointment of receivers pursuant to a
statutory procedure may either herald the initiation of a federal
bankruptcy proceeding wherein debts will be canceled or an ar-
rangement confirmed, 138 or indicate that a dissolution proce-
dure has been initiated under state law.' 39 The appointment of a
receiver in these cases is often dependent on some showing of
insolvency. It usually indicates to the creditor that his property is
going to be dealt with in a way that is beyond his control and to
the investing public that the corporate entity may be on the
verge of bankruptcy or liquidation. The appointment of an
equity receiver in an SEC enforcement action, however, does not
necessarily signal the need for or institution of a bankruptcy
proceeding.
It is precisely this failure to distinguish among the various
types of receivers in the covenants of loan agreements that has
forced the SEC to seek similar remedies with new names.' 40 The
intent of the covenants is usually to call loans only when the
company is nearing insolvency. A receivership, requested by the
SEC and imposed by the courts, is traditionally available only in
cases of massive fraud, where allowing existing management to
remain would be highly detrimental to the investors and cre-
ditors alike. It is instituted to protect the public and often to put
I See generally 16 W. FLETCHER, supra note 74, § 7666.
1"I 11 U.S.C. § ll(a)(3) (1970).
'See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 291-303 (Supp. 1971).
140 Confusion surrounds the definition of "receiver" in other areas as well. In re Blair
& Co., 471 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 212 (1973), dismissed as moot, 495
F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1974), concerned whether a liquidator appointed pursuant to New
York Stock Exchange rules was a receiver within the contemplation of the Bankruptcy
Act (11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(5) (1970)), which deems an act of bankruptcy the appointment of
a receiver of an insolvent's property.
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the company back in a position of viability. It would seem unten-
able for a creditor to argue that he is in a worse position after
the imposition of this remedy than before, assuming that no
other conditions of default have occurred.
In Ferguson v. Tabah,'14 a derivative suit in which massive
fraud, waste, and mismanagement were alleged, the court sus-
tained the appointment of a receiver, saying:
[T]he factors usually militating against the appointment
of a receiver are not so strong in this case. [Defendant's]
credit position has been severely jolted over the last de-
cade by the apparent repeated raids by its management
.... [I]t is not unreasonable to hope for even a com-
paratively favorable response from financial and credit
institutions because of the appointment of the
receiver.1
42
A realistic approach to the needs of the company and a specific
molding of the decree appointing a receiver to fit those needs
are far more important than the label "receiver."'
143
As has been argued, the imposition of an interim board or
the appointment of special counsel may be an unwarranted in-
terference with the power of shareholders to determine the di-
rection of the corporation, vesting it solely, if temporarily, in the
SEC and the federal courts. Shareholder elections are
suspended144 and any attack on the imposition of these remedies
is subject to being enjoined by the federal court as an attack on
its judgment. 45 Although a receivership also has this effect, it is
established in the minds of the public and the courts as a drastic
remedy. The grounds for its institution and its duration are
established by settled legal traditions.
It is the SEC staff's position that the imposition of interim
directors and special counsel is an alternative to a receivership
and will be requested most often in cases where there are
grounds for the appointment of a receiver. However, the failure
to identify these remedies adequately as modified forms of re-
ceivership (for fear that the label will invoke a procession of
141 288 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1961).
142 Id. at 674-75.
143 In those cases in which the SEC has obtained receivers, mismanagement and
friaud have been so extensive that other covenants of outstanding loan agreements prob-
ably have already been breached.
144 Text accompanying note 109 supra.
145 See, e.g., International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1352 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
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horribles) gives them the appearance of normalcy which is pre-
cisely te appearance the Commission and often the defendant
corporation are seeking. But this failure obscures the facts that
flexible alternatives to the receivership should be instituted only
in extreme cases where management has effectively forfeited its
right to control the corporation, 146 and that they are unusual
and temporary measures designed only to bring the corporation
back into compliance with applicable law, to ascertain the current
state of affairs, and to make required disclosures.
If they serve any further purpose, such as allowing the SEC
or the courts to influence the policies of the business or the
substantive nature or character of the organization itself, these
remedies are inappropriate for the Commission to request and
the courts to grant. The restructuring of companies so that sub-
stantive business decisions, placed by state law in the hands of
shareholders and their managers, become subject to scrutiny by
the SEC is not properly ancillary to the Commission's power to
obtain injunctions to enforce compliance with the securities laws,
nor does it seem to be a traditional and appropriate way to
further the statutory purposes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The imposition of an equity receivership, though a drastic
remedy which temporarily alters the basically state-created
power relationship between stockholders and management, is a
traditional remedy which is imposed only as a last resort, in
accordance with established standards when compliance with
federal law can be assured through no less drastic means. The
grounds for the imposition of special counsel and interim direc-
tors, however, have not been articulated, the nature of the re-
medies themselves is not clear, and the reasons for increased
oversight by the Commission of substantive business decisions
have not been explained.
Responsibility for the exploration and ultimate resolution of
these concerns rests with the courts because their powers are
invoked to give force to the consent decrees which incorporate
these remedies. Following the model of the recently enacted
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 1 4 7 which encourages in-
creased judicial scrutiny of antitrust consent decrees, courts in
the SEC enforcement area should determine that a consent de-
146 Cf. Mintzer v. Arthur L. Wright & Co., 263 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1959).
147 Pub. L. No. 93-528, (Dec. 21, 1974), in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 6666.
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cree judgment is in the public interest, considering such factors
as:
(1) the... impact of such judgment, including termina-
tion of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement
and modification, duration or [sic] relief sought, antici-
pated effects of alternative remedies actually consi-
dered, and any other considerations bearing upon the
adequacy of such judgment;
(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the pub-
lic generally . . . including consideration of the public
benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of
the issues at trial.
14 8
The courts should specifically consider the impact of the remedy
on the stockholders and creditors and should address the possi-
bility of alternative remedies. For example, if it is determined
that corporate management must be replaced to assure future
compliance with federal law, a court is faced with the alternatives
of (a) holding an election of directors under court supervision, if
necessary, and requiring that all candidates be independent of
existing management; 149 (b) instituting some modified form of
receivership, such as the appointment of a fiscal agent, special
counsel, or interim directors; (c) institution of an equity receiver-
ship; or (d) some form of a statutory bankruptcy proceeding. In
evaluating these alternatives the court should make clear the
differences among them, and, most importantly, in cases where
the remedy is not defined through the statutes or through the
traditions of common law, articulate the nature of the remedy
itself.
Further, if one of the drastic forms of relief is to be im-
posed, the court should explicitly set out the standards by which
the particular form of relief was selected, the period during
which the shareholders' right to choose who will manage the
company will be suspended, and why lesser remedies are not
148 Id. § 2. This Act also provides for a period of public comment on any proposed
settlement. Such a provision does not seem necessary for the proposed remedies dis-
cussed in this Comment. Such a procedure, however, would ensure that those who find
the consent decrees too lenient would be heard. Cf. Gapay, supra note 29.
149 Cf. Orth v. Transit Inv. Corp., 132 F.2d 938, 945 (3d Cir. 1942). This case also
presents an interesting question, beyond the scope of this Comment, as to whether exist-
ing management violates its fiduciary responsibility when it consents to the appointment
of interim directors in an enforcement action, thus binding the stockholders to a situa-
tion wherein their power has been severely limited. Id.
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sufficient to bring the corporation back into compliance with
federal law. The court entering the judgment should require
that notice of the imposition of any form of receivership or
modified recievership be sent to shareholders, and, in proper
cases, should provide a period, during which shareholders may
suggest ways in which the consent decree may be modified to
reduce the impact on shareholder rights without hindering the
law-enforcement goals of the SEC.
Finally, much of the discussion in this Comment concerning
the powers and duties of court-appointed directors has been
tentative. This is because there has been little judicial discussion,
in either a decree-entering or adversary context, of the limits to
appointed directors' powers. Under the terms of negotiated de-
crees, such appointed agents appear to have power to manage
the firm equal to that of elected directors. Courts would do well,
in the consideration of future consent decrees, to define pre-
cisely the power to be vested in appointed directors. Just as re-
stricted receivers have been appointed with powers limited to
those necessary to correct a specific situation, 150 restricted direc-
tors could be appointed with their power limited, for example, to
the routine decisionmaking necessary to manage the company
on a day-to-day basis.
The power to create and enforce remedies beyond a simple
injunction is an important ingredient of a meaningful regulatory
scheme. The SEC has requested a variety of remedies which are
either formally ancillary to the issuance of an injunction (as in
the case of mandated corporate procedures) or appropriate to
promote the statutory goals (such as the award of monetary re-
lief). The appointment of special agents to ensure compliance
with an injunction may appropriately be an ancillary form of
relief. Greater judicial oversight and articulation of the precise
nature and goal of these remedies is needed, however, if the
federal courts are to respect their traditionally limited jurisdic-
tion by the specific molding of the remedy to the nature of the
violation to be corrected. The federal securities laws are at best a
limited federal corporation law,' 5 ' and the SEC and federal
courts are bound to respect the limits which are inherent in a
statutory scheme aimed at ensuring disclosure in the sale of sec-
urities and not at the substantive regulation of business itself.
Q" Cj. SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1972).
1,1 See geneially Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974).
